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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Introduction
Corwin brings before this Court a question of law, asking

if criminal evidence that had a statute of limitations expired,
and revived by unreasonable application of a legislative act,
is action that is reprehensible and objectionable to the interest
of finality in judgments of constitutional conclusions of guilty
pleas, the substantive due process doctrine, statutory law, and
the ex post facto clause.
B.

Statement Of The Facts and Course Of The Proceedings.
On January 31, 1998, Corwin was issued a Uniform Citation

for Driving Under the Influence of Alchole (DUI), Idaho Code
section (I.C. §), 18-8004.
"R", pp. 71 & 73.

Judgment was entered March 12, 1998.

In conjunction with the advice given about

Corwin's statutory and constitutional rights, including the
right to counsel, at sentencing the Court gave Corwin written
notice of penalties for subsequent violations of the DUI statute,
"R", p. 75.

On November 17, 1998, a Washington Uniform Court Dockett
was filed charging Corwin with DUI from intoxicating liquor or
drugs.

Corwin entered a guilty plea on January 26, 1999, in the

Ritzville District Court, State of Washington.

"R", p. 77 & 81.

On October 24, 2007, Corwin was convicted by jury trial
of a DUI violation, I.C. § 18-8004.

One day later, the court

found Corwin guilty of felony DUI, after accepting the above
two convictions as criminal evidence.

A direct appeal was filed,

and upon its finalization, a petition for post-conviction was
-
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filed on September 15, 2010.
The Court filed a notice of intent to dismiss, and counsel
on February 28, 2011, responded that Corwin was standing upon
the previous pleadings in this matter as well as the applicable
statutory and case law.

"R", p. 103.

Seven months later, on November 2, 2011, Corwin gave Notice
to the Court that he was having a conflict with counsel's representation.

He asserted that counsel had failed to amend his

first cause of action, and went on to clarify that counsel had
not consulted with him on whether legal research or a brief
would be filed.

"R", pp. 112, 113

&

116.

See also p. 124.

The record reflects Corwin wanted to correct and amend
the record, and to substitute counsel.

A motion was filed on

February 17, 2012, to suspend the proceedings and was never
heard.

"R", pp. 125-126.

Corwin further submitted as cause,

a letter counsel sent to him advicing him that he felt Judge
Ryan was going to grant him an evidentiary hearing.

Counsel

felt he would be able to present evidence to support his petition,
and get the judge to withdraw his guilty plea.

"R", p. 1 41 •

An evidentiary hearing was held on November 29, 2012.
The court filed its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,
and on January 2, 201 3, counsel filed a notice of appeal.

As prelim-

ary issues, he presented two questions regarding the Court's
abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Withdraw a guilty
plea.

"R", p. 174.

-
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I
Is the use of expired criminal evidence by unreasonable application of a legislative act, reprehensible
and objectionable to the interest of finality in constitutional conclusions of guilty pleas, the substantive due process doctrine, and the ex post facto
clause?
II
Should the district court have resolved a conflict
of interest issue, and substituted counsel before
addressing the claims on their merits?

-
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I
Is the use of expired criminal evidence by unreasonable
application of a legislative act, reprehensible and
objectionable to the interest of finality in constitutional conclusions of guilty pleas, the substantive due
process doctrine, and the ex post facto clause.
C.

Standards Of Review.
In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the

allegations must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
I.C. § 19-4907; McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 699-700, 992
P.2d 144, 148-49 (1999).

When reviewing a decision denying post-

conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court
will not disturb the lower court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous.

I.R.C.P. 52(a); Id. at 700, 992 P.2d at 149.

The

credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are
all matters solely within the province of the district court.
Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct.App.1988).
The Appeal's Court exercises free review of the district court's
application of the relevant law to the facts.

Roberts v. State,

132 Idaho 494, 496, 495 P.2d 782, 784 (1999).
D.

Ineffective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel.
A defendant may raise issues of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel either on direct appeal or in a petition for postconviction relief, but not both.
801, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992).

Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho

Corwin raises ineffective assistance

of post-conviction counsel only on the first issue.

Corwin

acknowledges that ineffective assistance claims usually cannot
- 4 -

be treated on direct review for want of an opportunity to develop
and include in the record evidence bearing on the merits of the
allegations.

Cf. Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d

789 (1989)(inadequately raised issues on post-conviction are
permitted to be raised in a subsequent application.)

In this

case Corwin asserts the record is sufficient to permit a fair
evaluation of the merits of his claim.
E.

The Argument
Corwin asserts that criminal evidence that has a statute

of limitations, which has expired, cannot be used in a subsequent
prosecution of the DUI statute without offending the interest of
finality in constitutional conclusions of guilty pleas, the substantive due process doctrine, and the ex post facto clause.

This

affirmation is derived because the constitution does not permit
infringement on finality of judgments, the substantive due process
doctrine does not permit unreasonable application of a legislative
act, and the ex post facto clause protects more than liberty.
In 1998, I.e.§ 18-8005 defined, created, and regulated
Corwin's conduct as a violator of the DUI statute.

The statute's

intent to deter Corwin from committing another DUI described that:
if a defendant was found guilty of the DUI statute and had two
prior convictions within five (5) years, that person would be
guilty of a felony.

I.e. § 18-8005, further mandated the court

give notice of the penalties that would be imposed for subsequent
violations.

From this law Corwin's two 1998 DUI convictions

became criminal evidence to a subsequent violation, if that
violation occurred within five years.
-
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From the above substantive law one can only presume the
legislature intended an expiration date on what has been determined
as the sentencing objective of deterrent.

See State v. Nickerson,

121 Idaho 925, 929, 828 P.2d 1330 (Ct.App.1992)(held that the
legislature's ultimate objective to mandate the notice of I.e.

§

18-8005, was a means of accomplishing the sentencing objective of
deterring future offenses.)

Therefore, a subsequent violation

within that time period, permitted admission of convictions as
evidence to aggravate the penalties that may be imposed.
In 1998, Corwin in two separate occasions was cited, and
convicted of two DUis.

He entered plea agreements in both cases,

and pled guilty voluntarily with the foregoing understanding.
Those convictions in 2003 became "null and void" as evidence in
any subsequent violation.

The state nonetheless under authority

of the 2006 amended DUI statute (1) unreasonably applied time-barred
criminal evidence, and (2) th~ statute itself was enacted after the
pre-existing period had expired on that evidence.
Post-conviction counsel abdicated this claim and did not
present it to the court by brief or at the evidentiary hearing.
The District Court was left with only the allegations made in
the first cause of action of the petition.

The Court's analysis

of State v. Lamb, 147 Idaho 133, 206 P.3d 497 (Ct.App.2009), was
employed in concluding that Corwin's substantive due process
violation was without merit.

The court viewed Corwin's claim

as being the same as in Lamb.

This was error.

The precepts in Lamb were that a trial court's advisement
of the risk of future penalties under a recidivist statute is
-
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a warning designed to deter a defendant from committing future
offenses, not a promise that puts restraints on future prosecutions.

(The Lamb Court citing, State v. Nickerson, 121 Idaho

925, 928, 828 P.2d 1330, 1333 (Ct.App.1992)).

That conclusion

ensued from Lamb's assertion that the trial Court's warnings in
his prior DUI convictions, somehow had become part of his plea
agreement.

This Court held his claim was frivolous.

In contrast to Lamb and Nickerson Corwin brings before this
Court two questions of law entwined to the same end.

The first

is: Is criminal evidence that had a statute of limitations expire
and revived by unreasonable application of a legislative act, is
that action reprehensible and objectionable to the interest of
finality in judgments of constitutional conclusions of guilty
pleas?

The second is: Does the Federal and State Constitution's

ex post facto clauses protect individuals from cruel and unusual
punishments, by preventing governments from applying enacted
statutes unreasonably, that are "manifestly unjust and oppressive"
in its retroactive effect?
The Court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
reflected that Corwin was asserting "the revision of I.C. §
18-8005(5) constituted a violation of the contracts clause and
the state whould have been estopped by judgment and law from
relitigating those two prior DUis."

"R", p. 165.

The Court

therefore quoted State v. Lamb, 147 Idaho 133, 206 P.3d 497
(Ct.App.2009), as rejecting the same claim raised by Corwin.
This error committed by the Court was due to post-conviction
counsel's abdication of this claim.
-
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Corwin contended by petition that the validity of negotiated
convictions and the integrity of their judgments could not be
compromised.

"R", p. 6.

Entwined with this claim was that

retrospective application of law which makes evidence that was
made incompetent by substantive law, to then become competent
alongside

competent evidence was unreasonable classification

of Corwin as a violator of felony law.

"R", p. 5.

conviction counsel's duty to make that clear.

It was post-

Of how the essence

of due process is to protect unreasonable action.

Black's Law

Dictionary, 6th Ed., 13th reprint-1998.
Post-conviction counsel's abdication of this claim allowed
the Court to derive its conclusions from assertions made in the
petition.

The adjudicative facts perceived by the Court are

therefore lacking in clarity and logic as to why Corwin is legally
innocent of a felony.
F.

The Finality Of Judgments And Guilty Pleas.
The law at issue here created an extended ten years "look

back" period extending

the time in which the State would be allowed

to inquire into the admissibility of criminal evidence to aggraI.C. § 18-8005(6) states that

vate the prosecution of a DUI.

anyone who is found guilty of violating I.C.

§ 18-8004, and has

had two prior convictions of that code within ten years shall
be guilty of a felony.

This law was unreasonably used to permit

evidence that was "null and void" to be admitted, which the
passage of time had previosly barred.

Do this features of the

law taken together produce the kind of retroactivity that State
law and the Constitutions and U.S. Supreme Court decisions forbid?
-
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Corwin concludes that they do.
The admission of criminal evidence is prohibited by the
interest in finality of judgments when a guilty plea is at issue.
United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979)([W]hen a
guilty plea is at issue, "the concern with finality served by
limitation on collateral attack has special force.")

This Court

just as many others have held that a defendant has no right
under the Constitution to collaterally attack the validity of
prior misdemeanor DUis.
90 P.3d 314 (2004).
statutory law

See State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 92,

Similarly, the state has not acquired by

a right to permeate the understanding and validity

of voluntary guilty pleas.
the due process clause.

These are accrued rights under the

I.C. § 73-106 directs as follows:

"No action or proceeding commenced before the compiled
laws take effect, and no right accrued, is effected by
their provisions, but the proceeding therein must conform to the requirements of the compiled laws as far as
applicable."
In this case finality of judgements of constitutional conclusions
were at rest, final.
The retroactive application of the amended law bestowed the
state with an acute form of penetrating finality of judgments.
It is undisputed that Corwin has performed as mandated by law
and plea agreements, and complied with the terms of his original
judgment.

The state received the benefits of its bargain and

the legislature received its five years deterrence of its sentencing
objective.

It would therefore be unjust to allow one party to

permeate the understanding a court and Corwin had when they finalized
the constitutional conclusions involved.
-

9 -

A plea that is entered with a full understanding of what
the plea connotes and its consequences is a valid plea.

E.g.,

Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 99, 982 P.2d 931, 934 (1999).

Corwin

thus asserts the integrity of contractual judgments cannot be
compromised by a change in the law.
The United States Supreme Court in Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S.
20, 113 s.ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391

(1992), noted that principles

of finality associated with habeas corpus actions applied with
at least equal force, if a defendant sought to attack a previous
conviction used for sentencing.

Similarly, the extension of

an expired statute of limitations, by retroactive application of
a legislative act the state has manipulated a district court to
deprive another court's judgment of its normal force and effect,
in a proceeding that had an independent purpose, as it considered
Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements.

Just as a defen-

dant has no right to collaterally challenge the validity of
contractual findings of guilt, because they are final, the state
should also be prohibited in permeating the finality of judgments
to constitutional conclusions by retroactive application of
law, as in this case.
"Inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures."

United States v.

Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184, n.11

That was dicta by

(1979).

the high court in unfolding the interest of promoting the finality
of judgments.
I.e.

§ 73-106, directs that no right accrued is affected

by new law, and proceedings must conform to the requirements
- 10 -

of compiled laws.

How many times can a statute of limitations

expire, and how many times can legislature revive dead evidence
in the so called orderly administration of justice by the judiciary?

You can have life extended, but you can't bring back

the dead over and over.

The United States Supreme Court and

the Idaho courts have accepted the interest that finality has
served on limitations of defendants attacking collaterally guilty
pleas.

Why not then when retroactive application of new laws

permeate guilty pleas?
The foregoing principle bears weight on the issue at hand
and the interest of finality.

The conclusion Corwin urges is

mandated by stare decisis, the substantive due process doctrine,
and Idaho code.
G.

The Ex Post Facto Connection.
Inadmissible evidence that is used to enhance a conviction

should fall within the categorical descriptions of the ex post
facto laws Justice Chase set forth in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648, 650 (1978); because
no quantum of reasoning can revive evidence with a statutory
limit once it has expired.

Corwin is arguing the inadmissibility

of evidence at a criminal proceeding.
I.e.

§ 18-8005 is not ex post facto; but its retroactive

application in this case, where evidence is "null and void",
is ex post facto.

The Idaho courts and numerous other state

courts have fallen on the precept that the United States Supreme
Court has consistently and routinely held that statutes that
increase penalties for recidivism do not violate the ex post facto
- 11 -

clause.

Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26, 27, 113 s.ct. 517,

521, 522, 121 L.Ed.2d 391, 401, 402 (1992).
Court has done the same.

The Idaho Supreme

Freeman v. State, 131 Idaho 722, 963

P.2d 1159 (1998).
Corwin asserts that recidivist statutes do not violate a
defendant's rights, because a defendant doesn't have any rights
that have been granted.

With exception, recidivist statutes

are enhancing penalties for crimes that permit an inquiry into
evidence which does not have an expiration date.

Corwin thus

claims that where a statute of limitation exist on criminal
evidence, that element has to be considered in the inquiry.
The legislature is presumed to have intended an expiration
of its deterrent purpose, otherwise why would they have placed
an amnesty on such criminal evidence.
law and not procedural law.

This statute is substantive

Litigants have rights in substantive

law.
Instructive in this claim is State v. Currington, 108 Idaho
539, 541, 700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985), in its analysis the court
incorporated the following statement of the distinction between
substantive law and procedural law:
"Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct
and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates
defines, and regulates primary rights.
In contrast,
practice and procedure pertain to the essentially
mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive
law, rights, and remedies are effectuated."
(quoted by
the court from State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d
674, 677 (1974)(en bane).
State v. Beam, 121, Idaho 862, 863, 864, 826 P.2d 891, 892, 893
(1992); see also Allen v. Fisher, 118 Ariz. 95, 96, 574 P.2d
1314, 1315 (Ariz.App.Div.1977).
- 12 -

In this case the DUI statute prescribes norms for societal
conduct and punishment by its deterrent purpose.

It does not

seek to regulate the mechanical operations of the courts by
which substantive law, rights and remedies are effectuated.

It

further prescribes a limit of time on criminal evidence that
may be introduced.
Corwin contends that retroactive application of the amended
DUI statute, took away and impaired rights acquired under the
1998 DUI statute and created a new obligation.

See I.e.§ 73-

106, and Ohlinger v. United States, 135 F.Supp. 40 (D.Idaho 1955)
(The court defined "a retroactive law, in the legal sense, is
one that takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under
existing laws, or creates a new obligation,
imposes a new duty, or attaches
a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations
already past."

Id. at 42.)

The United States Supreme Court in arguments about ex post
facto laws reasoned that, after a certain time, no quantum of
evidence is sufficient to convict.
404 U.S. 307, 322 ( 1971).

See United States v. Marion,

In this sense, a new law would "violate"

previous evidence-related legal rules by authorizing the courts
to receive evidence which the Courts of Justice would not previously have admitted as sufficient proof of a crime.

Cf. Collins

v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 46 (1990)("subtle ex post facto
violations are no more permissible than overt ones."); Cummings
v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 227, 329 (1867)(The ex post facto clause
cannot be evaded by the form in which the power of the State is
exerted.")
- 13 -

Judgments typically rest in large part upon evidentiary
concerns.

For example, the passage of time that has eroded

memories, made witnesses or other evidence unavailable.

United

States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); 4 W. LaFave, J.
Israel, and N. King, Criminal Procedure§ 18.5(a), p. 718 (1999);
Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice§ 316, at 210.

The high

court once described statutes of limitations as creating "a
presumption which renders proof unnecessary."

Wood v. Carpenter,

101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
Similarly in this case, to resurrect evidence after the
relevant statute of limitations has expired is to eliminate a
currently existing conclusive presumption forbidding admissibility,
and thereby to permit aggravation of a crime on a quantum of
evidence where that quantum, at the time the new law was enacted,
would have been legally inadmissible.

In that sense, the new

law "violates" previous evidence related legal rules by authorizing the court to receive evidence which a court of justice would
not previously have admitted as sufficient proof for aggravating
a conviction.
Corwin asserts that the ex post facto clause, the substantive
due process doctrine protected him from cruel and unusual punishments prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, by preventing governments from applying enacted statutes with manifestly unjust and
oppressive retroactive effects.
Alternatively, extension of statutes of limitations before
their expiration dates are not violative of ex post facto law.
Cf. Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. 506, 514 (1880)("[I]n any case
- 14 -

where a right to acquittal has not been absolutely acquired by
the completion of the period of limitation, that period is subject
to enlargement or repeal without being obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.")
Similarly, if criminal evidence has a statute of limitations
that has not expired, they can be lawfully extended. Alternatively,
if criminal evidence has an expired limitation, the retroactive
application, as in this case, by the use of the increased "look
back" period is a

form of ex post facto law.

As was said in

Cummings v. Missouri, supra, the ex post facto clause cannot be
evaded by the form in which the power of the state is exerted.
Therefore, the substantive due process doctrine and the ex post
facto clause prohibit unreasonable application of law to aggravate
penalties.
The United States Constitution's two ex post facto clauses,
Art. I, § 9, cl.3, Art. I,§ 10, cl.1, the Idaho Constitution's
ex post facto clause, Art. I, § 16, the substantive due process
doctrine, I.e. §§ 73-101, 73-106, and the finality of judgment
doctrine of guilty pleas prohibit retroactive application of the
2006 amendm?nt to the DUI statute in this case.
II
Should the district court have resolved a conflict
of interest issue, and substituted counsel before
claims on their merits.
H.

The Abuse of Discretion Argument.
Idaho Courts have held that a post-conviction court that

is presented with a request for appointed counsel must address
that request before ruling on the substantive issue in the case.
-
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I.C. § 19-4904 annotation, Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 214 P.3d
668 (2009), reviewed denied.

Where counsel has been

appointed, a district court appoints counsel in order to give the
applicant an opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege
the necessary supporting facts.

I.C. § 19-4904 annotation,

Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168,254 P.3d 69 (2011), review
denied.
More, I.e.§ 19-4908 permits successive petitions for postconviction relief, if for "sufficient reason" an issue was inadequately raised.

Ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel

has been held to be sufficient reason.

Hernandez v. Idaho, 133

Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct.App.1999)(An allegation of ineffective
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if true, provides
sufficient reason for permitting newly asserted allegations to be
raised in a subsequent post-conviction application.)(citing,
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596, 635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981 ).
Corwin avers that post-conviction counsel denied him effective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest he had
in his representation, but kept silent.

Corwin reserves this

claim for successive collateral review, if it becomes necessary.
He raise ineffective assistance facts as part of the question
leading to the court's discretion to appoint substitute counsel.
Corwin contends the judiciary had a duty to resolve the conflict
that existed, in order to not delay and impair the orderly administration of justice.

Now this Court of Appeals is involved,

and will a successive petition have to follow?
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Corwin asserts that the initial-review collateral proceeding
in this case was the first designated proceeding for Corwin to
raise a claim of ineffective assisance of trial counsel, and as
such this post-conviction proceeding is equivalent of prisoner's
direct appeal, as to the denial of a constitutional right.

An

attorney on a direct appeal with a conflict of interest knows
he has duty to give notice by motion to the court, before the
claims are resolved on their merits.

Otherwise a prisoner may

be denied a fair process and the opportunity to comply with
state procedures.
Corwin contends that the underlying ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claim is a substantial one and had merit.

Post-

conviction counsel failed to file a notice akin to an Anders
brief with the court.

In effect conceding that he could not

represent Corwin in his petition for post-conviction.

The record

reflects Corwins complaints and desire to substitute counsel.
Did the court abused its discretion in ignoring the conflict
and to take adequate steps to ascertain whether there was a risk
of an actual conflict of interest to warrant substituting counsel.
The record identifies that a plausible defense was foreclosed
because of this conflict.

The District Court acknowledge that

Corwin's assertion of trial counsel's failure to contact him, and
investigate his case, taken as true, suggests that counsel may
have been deficient for failing to diligently pursue his case.
"R", p. 169.

Now the system is beginning to clog up a valid and

meritorious claim of neglect by a trial counsel, that reaches
complete denial of counsel.

See "R", p. 6.
-
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Trial counsel had a duty to make reasonable investigations
or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigation unnecessary.

In an ineffectiveness case, a particular

decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness under all the circumstances.

See Wiggins v. Smith,

539 U.S. 510, 521-22 (2003)(citing, Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 690-91

(1984).

Trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing testified that
when his client and himself do not see eye to eye on the theory
of the defense, he will switch the client with somebody else.
Tr., p. 92, Ls. 16-19.

Counsel further asserted that since the

theory of was that Corwin was not the driver, he had to assume
Corwin told him he was not driving.

Tr., p. 96, ls. 10-17.

Corwin was claiming counsel never had any communication
with him to make a decision on how to defend him.

He testified

at the hearing that on October 15, one week before trial, and
in open court, counsel admitted he had not talked to any witnesses
or to Corwin.

Tr., p. 18, ls 4-5.

Corwin further stated counsel

came to the jail to visit him only once, and that was the night
before the trial.

Tr., pp 17 and 18.

Corwin's wife was one

of those witnesses, and the trial transcripts reveal Corwin
was the driver.
This case was tried on a lie, which was recorded on a police
report.

Furthermore, counsel revealed that of about 89 cases he

defended by jury trial, a substantial number of those cases were
tried with post-conviction.

Tr., p. 88, ls. 19-22.

More, post-

conviction counsel failed to discover the county jail logbook
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on attorney visits, or Corwin's criminal file of the criminal
diary.

He also failed to submit the transcripts of the trial.

Post-conviction counsel was having to accuse a friend,
ex-associate and now judge.
and his case.

He therefore ignored Corwin's pleas

Examples of his neglect are found in a letter

and the notice of appeal he filed.

"R", pp. 141 and 174.

Counsel

was defending a non-existing motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
Post-conviction counsel like trial counsel neglected and ignored
his client.

Was it counsel's obligation as an officer of the

court to bring this conflict to the court, or was it the court's
duty to inquire into Corwins Notice of Conflict and his motions.
CONCLUSION
Corwin therefore prays this court reaches the conclusions
urged herein and vacates the felony conviction; or in the alternative remand this case for the court to substitute counsel,
and give new counsel time to prepare for an evidentiary hearing.

Larry De'an Corwin
Petitioner-Appellant

- 19 -

